SOME LIMITED-INTEREST PROBLEMS
EDWAtRD S. GoDFREY*
This paper discusses a few of the problems that arise out of an insured property
loss where the policyholder's interest in the lost or damaged property, while suflicient
to be insurable, amounts to less than full unencumbered ownership.
For example, suppose that C, one of two joint owners of a building, without any
concealment or misrepresentation of the extent of his interest, obtains a fire policy
insuring him against loss or damage to the property and pays premiums at the
same rate that a sole owner would pay on the same property. The building burns.
Is C limited in recovery to one-half the value of the building at the time of the fire,
or may he recover in the same manner as if he were sole owner of the fee? If he
does recover, or is voluntarily paid, in excess of one-half the value of the building,
does he hord the excess in trust for his co-owner? What happens if the other owner
has also fully insured himself against loss to the same building?
Similar questions arise where the insured's interest is limited in other ways.
Typically, disputes in this area of the law arise where the insured is a party to a
bailment, land contract, mortgage, or lease. The property which is the subject of the
insurance may be real or personal. The peril insured against ,may be fire or other
hazard: although the law in this field has grown chiefly out of disputes arising under
fire policies, the rules thus developed have been adopted where other types of nonmarine property insurance are involved.1 Of course, regardless of the type of peril
covered, individual cases will be governed by specific policy language, especially
valued policy clauses, and by applicable statutory provisions.2
We may frame our inquiry in general form as follows: assuming that a property
loss has been sustained by a policyholder having a limited interest in the subject
of the insurance; that the company cannot defend successfully upon any theory of
misrepresentation, concealment, or breach of warranty or condition ;3 and that there
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'Non-fire cases, not marine, involving limited-interest problems have been generally decided according to rules worked out in fire cases with little judicial comment upon that fact: Lack v. Western Loan
& Building Co., 134 F. 2d 1o7 (9th Cir. 1943) (earthquake); Wohlt v. Farmers' Home Hail, Tornado
& Cyclone Ins. Co., 2o6 Wis. 35, 238 N. W. 809 (1931) (tornado); Crisp County Lumber Co. v.
Bridges, 187 Ga. 484, 200 S. E. 777 (1939) (storm).
'The effect of valued policy provisions will not be considered except incidentally. See Note, 68
A. L. R. 1344, 1352 (1930).
aLitigation frequently arises under policies which are in terms "void" if the interest of the insured
if not sole and unconditional ownership. (But see the 1943 New York standard fire insurance policy
in which this condition is eliminated.) Apart from statutory change, where the policyholder informs
the company's agent of the limited nature of his interest at the time of placing the insurance, all
but a few jurisdictions hold the company estopped to assert the breach of the sole-ownership condition.
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is no issue as to valuation of the loss apart from the question of measuring the in-

sured's limited interest 4 then:
(i) What is the proper measure of recovery by the policyholder against the
insurance company?
(2) If the company pays the policyholder the full amount of the loss, voluntarily
or after suit, may other persons having interests in the property compel him to
disgorge any part of his recovery?
(3) Where separate policies have been issued to the owners of other interests will
multiple recovery against the companies insuring the several risks be permitted in an
amount exceeding the total value of the property?"
These and other related problems have already received considerable attention
in the literature,' and it is not here intended to offer anything like a full synthesis
of the law on the subject. The peculiar rules in this branch of the law of insurance
have been worked out mainly through and around two general ideas: the idea of indemnity, and the idea that a non-marine property insurance contract is a personal contract.' Examination of the limited-interest cases over the past century reveals an interesting struggle in the courts over the scope and application of these juridical ideas.
The insurers have sought in court to have "indemnity" defined narrowly and applied
widely to limit recovery, and they have also sought to extend the doctrine that insurance is a personal contract so as to defeat recovery by or on behalf of any party to
whom they have not clearly consented to be bound.8 On the other side, policyholders
and other claimants have sought to expand the meaning of "indemnity" so as to
prevent it from limiting recovery and have argued that the doctrine of non-assignability should be held to its original procedural confines. It is the purpose of this paper
merely to show how the courts have resolved these opposed drives in a few types
of cases and to indicate the bearing of recent decisions on the conflict.
This result is reached despite nonwaiver clauses.
98 N. W. 227 (1904).

Welch v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia, 120 Wis. 456,

EDWIN W. PATTERSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON INSURANCE 711 (2d ed, 5947).

'The valuation problem has been treated by Bonbright and Katz, Valuation of Property to Measure
See also Note, Valuation and Measure of Recovery
Under Fire Insurance Policies, 49 COL. L. REv. 818 (1949).
The problem of contributing insurance will not be considered. See GEORGE RiCIARDs, TuE LAW o
INStUANCE 458-466 ( 4 th ed. 1932). Nor subrogation problems. See GEORGE W. GOBLE, CASES ON INSURFire Insurance Losses, 29 COL. L. REv. 857 (1929).

ANCE 709-726 (2d ed. 1949).
*See, e.g., 5 JoHrN A. APPLEMA.q, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, cc. 149-151 (1941); Goble, op. cit.
supra note 5, at 666-726; PATTERSON, Op. Cit. supra note 3, cc. 4-6, passim; RtctnADs, op. cit. supra note
5, at 64-70, 75-84, 467-482; 2 THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW oF DAMAGES 1514-1518
(9th ed. 1920); WIAM k. VANCE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF INSURANCE 652-666 (2d ed. 1930);
WILLIAM R. VANCE, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 659-689 (3d cd. 1940);

Harnett and Thornton, Insurable Interest in Property: A Socio-Economic Reevaluation of a Legal Concept,
48 COL. L. Rfv. 1162, 1I75-1178 (1948); Harvey, Insurance of Limited Interests-Mortgagor and
Mortgagee, zo L. Q. REv. 48 (1894); McClain, Insurance of Limited Interests Against Fire, xi H~ntv. L.
REv. 512 (x898); Note, 68 A. L. R. 1344 (1930). For a valuable discussion of the Canadian decisions,
see 7Campbell, Some Aspects of Insurable Interest, 27 CAN. B. REv. x, 8 (1949).
Lett v. G. F. Insurance Co., 125 N. Y. 82, 25 N. E. xo88 (189o).
'E.g., consent in advance would appear clearly implied in policies "for the benefit of whom it may
concern." See PATTERSON, op. cit. supra, note 3, at 178.

SoME LxITMmD-INTEREST

PROBLEMS

When a modern court states that a contract of property insurance is a contract of
indemnity, it usually has in mind some such proposition as this: that, unless otherwise
agreed or required by statute, the recovery of the insured must be measured by the
actual economic impairment of his interest in the insured resO Not less, for then the
insured would not get as much as he bargained and paid for; not more, for then
he might profit in some cases by occurrence of the insured event. The basic thought
behind this proposition seems to be that the loss insured against is the loss in value
of the insured's interest in the res, not necessarily the entire economic loss sustained
by the insured as a result of damage to that interest. Loss of rents or profits, for
example, is not recoverable under an owner's fire policy in the absence of specific
coverage." ° The insured's interest is thus conceived of as having an existence and
value independent of its connection with the particular insured and independent of
any special circumstances in which he may find himself. The amount of the loss is to
be objectively evaluated accordingly."
Emlin McClain has shown how the notion of indemnity, at first used chiefly as a
test for distinguishing insurance policies from wagering contracts, developed into a
norm for ascertaining the proper measurement of recovery.' McClain's conclusion
from examining the early limited-interest cases was :13
Although these illustrations indicate that a description of insurance as a contract of
indemnity did not mean all that such a statement has, in the later development of the
law, been supposed to mean, yet they may perhaps be considered as indicating a general
conception of the obligation of the insurer, limiting it in practice, so far as consistent with
the express language employed, to an obligation to make good the loss suffered by the
insured through the destruction of or injury to the property within the terms of the
contract. Judges have frequendy qualified the expression as to indemnity by saying that
the contract is not a perfect contract of indemnity, but the disposition has been very
strong to reason out every question arising as to the liability of the insurer on the theory
that indemnity only has been contracted for.
By the time McClain made his study, several peculiar applications of the indemnity principle had become well recognized. Thus, it was already settled that
the mortgagee or the vendor who insures his own interest in real estate against
fire is not limited in recovery to the extent to which his security is impaired below
* Cf. i JoHN
at 1176.
10

NV.

MAY, LAW OF INsuRM.1--

§6 ( 4th ed. igoo); Harnett and Thornton, supra note 6,

VANCE, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF INSURANCE 932 (2d ed. 1930).

See Bonbright and Katz, supra

note 4, at 865.
"' The courts tend to think of "value" itself as something "more or less intrinsic and objective."
Bonbright and Katz, supra note 4, at 864-866.
" McClain, supra note 6, at 512-515.
" Id. at 515. (Footnotes omitted.) This formulation of the doctrine of indemnity is somewhat
different from that suggested in the text, supra. Applied literally, McClain's proposition seems to exclude
recovery by a mortgagee who has insured his own interest and whose security remains ample despite
the damage to the premises. The decisions do not support such an exclusion, as McClain observes. Id.
at 517. On the other hand, his formulation would permit recovery of renis contrary to the decisions.
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the amount of his outstanding claim against the mortgagor or vendee.' 4 Such socured creditors insuring their own interest are held entitled to the amount of the loss
to the property itself, limited only by the face amount of the policy and the amount
of the outstanding debt. In brief, the company is not permitted to show that the
mortgagee or vendor is not really damaged because the remaining security is ample,
the courts emphasizing that the subject matter of the insurance is "the property,"
not the debt.' 5 However, in these cases "the property" turns out to be only the
insured's interest in the property, since all courts do limit the secured creditor's
recovery to the amount of his outstanding claim' 6 where no agency or trust can be
found to sustain recovery of an additional sum for the benefit of the debtor.' The
net effect is that the non-risk-bearing mortgagee or vendor who insures his own
interest recovers for his own use and benefit either the policy limit, or the amount
of the outstanding debt, or the amount of the loss or damage to the property as a
whole, whichever is least.
In all this there is no serious strain on the classical theory of indemnity. In fact,
these security cases strongly support the view that the loss or damage for which the
insured will be "indemnified" is the loss or damage sustained by his interest in the res
conceived as having independent existence and value-not necessarily the economic
loss actually sustained by the insured himself as a result of the disaster, nor yet
necessarily the full loss in value sustained by the res.
II
The bailment cases create little difficulty so far as the theory of indemnity is concerned. The bailee purporting to insure against loss to property held "in trust or on
commission, or sold but not removed," is permitted to recover the full amount of the
loss within the policy limit even though he is under no liability for loss of the goods,
has no lien for charges, and has not even adduced positive evidence of ratification or
adoption of the policy by the bailor either before or after the loss. 8 An original
intent to benefit some bailor is presumed. Ratification or adoption of the policy is
also presumed. Consequently, to the extent that recovery under the policy would
" Excelsior Fire Insurance Co. v. R. Ins. Co. of Liverpool, 55 N. Y. 343, 355 (z873) (mortgagee);
Wohlt v. Farmers' Home Hail, Tornado & Cyclone Insurance Co., 2o6 Wis. 35, 238 N. W. Bo (1931)
(vendor). The same principle has been applied to the insurance of a mechanics' lien. Royal Insurance
Co. v. Stinson, 103 U. S. 25 (1881). See Note, 68 A. L. R. 1344, 5350 (1930).
" Excelsior Fire Insurance Co. v. R. Ins. Co. of Liverpool, supra note 14.

This result has been
reached even where the mortgagee has collected the entire amount of the debt upon foreclosure after
the loss. Sun Insurance Office v. Beneke,-53 S. W. 98 (Tex. Civ. App. i899). Likewise, where the
mortgagor-owner has restored the damaged premises, without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagee,
before the loss became payable. Savarese v. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co., 260 N. Y. 45, 182 N. E. 665 (1932).
As to whether procuring of insurance by the mortgagee violates a provision in mortgagor's policy against
additional insurance, see Note, 66 A. L. R. 5573 (5930).
1
"This proposition does not hold in the relatively rare case where the mortgagee or vendor bear$
the risk of loss in the transaction.
"'Smith v. Hardware Dealers Mut. Fire Ins. CO., 253 Wis. 129, 33 N. W. 2d 2o6 (1948). See note
16 supra.
'Waring v. The Indemnity Fire Ins. CO., 45 N. Y. 6o6, 6 Am. Rep. 146 (1871).
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exceed the amount of loss to the bailee's own interest in the goods, he holds the proceeds for the use and benefit of the owner of the goods.19 Moreover, the bailor is permitted to recover on the bailee's policy if the bailee declines to do so.2 °
The device of implying an agency or trust has attracted the courts in other divided
interest cases where they have wished to prevent both the escape of the insurer and
the undesirable enrichment of the insured. Thus, despite English precedent to
the contrary, 1 the majority of American courts have permitted the contract vendee
of real estate who bears the risk of loss to recover insurance proceeds paid to the
vendor where covered loss or damage to the premises occurred before conveyance
of the title.22 Usually, where this result is reached, the vendor has placed the insurance some time prior to the making of the land contract.2 3 The vendor is said
to be trustee of the proceeds to the extent that they exceed the vendee's outstanding
obligation for the purchase price, although the vendor has made no express agree24
ment to insure for the vendee's benefit.

The problem of the courts in the land contract cases has been not so much how
to apply the indemnity principle as how to justify recovery by or for the vendee in
the face of the traditional rule against assignability of non-marine property insurance.
Whatever the procedural origin of the doctrine that non-marine property insurance
is a personal contract, 25 it has undoubtedly been fostered by the reluctance of the
courts to subject insurance companies to liability to strangers of unknown honesty
on contracts where there is often strong temptation -to fraud. The bailment cases
probably did not originally, and certainly do not now, represent a breach of this rule,
since consent in advance on the part of the company to recovery by or for the bailorowner is reasonably inferred from the known needs of commerce. 0 However, in the
land contract cases, the circumstances are not so helpful in supporting the inference
of consent in advance. The moral hazard seems clearly greater, in fact, in the case
of the risk-bearing vendee in possession of realty than in the case of the bailorowner of goods who is out of possession. But the courts are faced with a trilemma:
they must either (i) let the company escape liability so far as the vendee's interest
"' The precise language of the policy must be watched. Where the policy covered bailee's "interest in
and legal liability for" property held by bailee "in trust or on commission or on joint account with others
or on storage or for repairs," it was held that the bailor-owner's interest had not been covered. Brooklyn
Clothing Corp. v. Fidelity-PhenLx Fire Ins. Co., 205 App. Div. 743, 200 N. Y. Supp. 208 (2d Dep't 1923).
11Exton & Co. v. Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 249 N. Y. 258, 164 N. E. 43 (1928); Kellner v.
Fire Association of Philadelphia, 128 Wis. 233, io6 N. W. xo6o, i6 Am. St. Rep. 45 (19o6).
" Rayner v. Preston, i8 Ch.D. x (x881).
But see Brownell v. Board of Educa"E.g., Brady v. Welsh, 2oo Iowa 44, 204 N. W. 235 (925).
tion, 239 N. Y. 369, 374, 146 N. E. 630, 631 (1925). See Notes, 37 A. L. R. 1324 (X925), 40 A. L. R.
607 (1926), 51 A. L. R. 929 (1927). Where risk of loss is on the vendor before conveyance, the vendee
has been held not entitled to specific performance with application of vendor's insurance money to the
purchase price. Brownell v. Board of Education, supra. See Pepper, The Rights of Vendor and
Vendee in Respect of a Policy of Insurance Upon Property Sold, 33 Am. L. REG. 134 (1894).
"But in Godfrey v. Alcorn, 215 Ky. 465, 284 S. W. 1094 (i926), the vendor insured his own
interest after the contract had been made.
"See PAIrERSON, op. cit. supra note 3, at 181.
" Brady v. Welsh, supra note 22.
26 See Waring v. The Indemnity Fire Ins. Co., 45 N. Y. 6o6, 6 Am. Rep. 146 (1871).
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is concerned, after it has collected premiums for coverage of the very premises
injured; or (2) let the vendor recover the entire insurance for his own sole benefit
when his interest in the property is limited to a vendor's lien, thus violating the indemnity principle; or (3)let the vendee recover against the company or against
the vendor on the fiction of a trust, thus actually, though not openly, violating the
personal-contract principle.?7 Presented with these alternatives, the courts have generally chosen the third, sometimes in the teeth of policy language strongly indicating
that the insurer would have declined in advance to become liable for any loss or
damage to a vendee's interest.2 s Justification for this choice has been found in the
equitable rights and duties that spring out of the land contract. The prevailing attitude is as stated in the opinion adopted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
20
Reed v. Lukens:
...the plaintiff [vendee] was still obliged to take the property and pay the purchase
money. The insurance company, however, became liable to pay for the loss to the
defendant [vendor], because ...he, as respects third parties, not privy to the contract of
sale, is still to be regarded as the owner of the property. But as between himself and
the plaintiff, the property was not his, but the plaintiff's; he could not appropriate to
himself the money which the insurance company became liable to pay on that account;
he had the property in trust, and the right which accrued in consequence of its destruction,
took its place, was held in the same way, and liable to be enforced in a court of equity.
With this attitude prevalent, it is improbable that the clause contained in some
form in every standard fire .policy, purporting to invalidate an assignment of the
policy, or to invalidate the policy itself upon assignment, without consent of the
company, will of its own virtue save the company from liability for an amount including the vendee's interest, at least where the policy itself has not been assigned.
In Dubin Paper Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America," the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania permitted a vendee who had paid the full purchase price to prevail
in a bill in equity to compel the insurers (i) to pay the proceeds of two fire policies
to the representatives of the insured vendor and (2) to compel those representatives
to hold the proceeds as trustees for the plaintiff. One of the policies involved was
"substantially in accord" with the 1921 Pennsylvania standard fire policy, which contained a clause purporting to avoid the policy if assigned before loss."' The limiting
words of the 1943 New York standard fire policy, ".... nor in any event for more
than the interest of the insured . . . " pose a nice problem in this type of case
" Similar alternatives are discussed in Note, Subrogation of the Insurer to Collateral Rights of the
Insured, 28 COL. L. REv. 202, 203 (1928).
8
One of
" Dubin Paper Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 361 Pa. 68, 63 A. 2d 85 (1949).
te policies involved contained a provision: ". . . nor shall the interest of the vendee or any other

parties to the Agreement of Sale except the Assured hereunder be insured by this policy."

The vendec

prevailed in a bill in equity against the insurer and the vendor. This result is basically hard to reconcile
with cases like Ritson v. Atlas Assurance Co., 272 Mass. 73, 171 N. E. 448 (930), denying an undisclosed principal the right to sue on the policy even where he was a co-owner of the property with
the agent who was nominally insured.
29 44 Pa. 200, 202, 84 Am. Dec. 425, 427 (1863).

so 361 Pa. 68, 63 A. 2d 85 (1949).

"' 1d. at 86, 63 A. 2d at 94, n. 5.
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which apparently has yet to be decided. If the reasoning and language of the
Dubin case were followed, a vendee's interest might still be included by representation in the vendor's recovery even in a jurisdiction using the 1943 New York policy3 2
A strict construction of this language of the policy would eliminate any recovery
on behalf of a represented interest. The courts may choose to say that such a
sweeping change could not have been intended by the legislature, and thus permit
recovery under the old rules where represented interests are involved.
The equitable duties of the vendor of land have thus been the basis for the
finding of a fiduciary relationship between vendor and vendee, enabling the majority
of courts to hold the insurer fully liable and, at the same time, avoid enrichment of
the vendor as a result of the loss. In such a view of the matter, there is no basis for
subrogation by the insurer to the vendor's contract claim against the vendee.3
III
A different situation is presented where insurance is taken out by a mortgagee or
mortgagor. Here, neither party is entitled to any part of the proceeds of the other's
insurance,8 4 unless (I) there can be found some agreement by the policyholder to
insure for the benefit of the other party, so that an equitable lien may be imposed
upon the proceeds, 5 or (2) the policy itself contains language, such as an open or
union mortgage clause, upon which a right in the other party may be founded. In
the absence of some express manifestation of consent, the courts have found no basis
for inferring a fiduciary relationship between mortgagor and mortgagee in this connection.
The mortgage cases are also perfectly consistent with the strict idea of indemnity.
The mortgagee's recovery under his policy for his own benefit is limited as stated
earlier in this article. Under a policy taken out for his own sole benefit, the mortgagor-owner recovers the entire amount of the loss within the policy limit, a result
which is easily sustainable on the ground that he remains liable upon the mortgage
debt after the premises have been destroyed or damaged and bears the risk of loss.37
These rules obtain even where both parties have insured their interests separately. 3
" Ibid. See Patterson, Insurance Law During the War Years, 46 COL. L. fEv. 345, 354 (1946).
,3 See Note, Subrogation of the Insurer to the Collateral Rights of the Insured, 28 COL. L. REV. 202,
204 (1928).
"' Farmers' Loan & T. Co. v. Penn Plate Glass Co., 186 U. S. 434 (1902); Carpenter v. The Provident Washington Insurance Company, 16 Pet. 495 (U. S. X842). 5 APPLEMAN, op. cit. supra note 6,
§3381: Harvey, supra note 6, passim. See also Note, The Standard Mortgagee Clause in Fire Insurance
Policies, 33 COL. L. REv. 305 (1933)"Chipman v. Carroll, 53 Kan. r63, 35 Pac. 11o9 (1894).
"s See note 34 supra.
"'Royal Ins. Co. v. Stinson, 103 U. S. 25 (iS8r).

See Note, 68 A. L. R. 1344, 1350 (1930)'

Cf.

Harvey, supra note 6, at 48: "It would be otherwise if the debt were discharged by the loss of the
security, as in the case of a loan upon a bottomry or respondentia bond. In these loans the risk . . . is
upon the lender, and not on the owner, who can, therefore, recover . . . the excess only of the value of
the security over the amount of the advance."
" Farmers' Union Mut. P. Ass'n v. San Luis State Bank, 86 Colo. 293, 281 Pac. 366 (1929); Brant
v. Dixie Fire Ins. Co. of Greensboro, N. C., 179 S. C. 55, 183 S. E. 587 (1935).
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To prevent enrichment of either mortgagor or mortgagee, where a mortgagee has

insured for his own sole benefit his insurer will be subrogated pro tanto to the mortgage debt after paying the mortgagee on his policyf 9 Again, in permitting full
recovery by a mortgagor-owner, the courts have insisted that what is being measured
is the loss sustained by the insured's property interest itself, not necessarily the loss
actually sustained by the insured, who may have defaulted on his bond and whose
affairs may be so embarrassed that redemption is, in fact, quite improbable."0 The insured's property interest is thought of as still amounting to ownership of the res
although events have made its early defeasance almost certain.4
IV
There have been relatively few decisions on the proper measure of recovery by a
policyholder whose interest in the res is that of either common or joint ownership 2
Under the old standard fire policy forms, the sole and unconditional ownership
clause usually defeated such a policyholder at the outset.43
In the absence of circumstances raising an inference
of agency or trust for the
other cotenants, where one owner in common has insured the common property for
its full value, recovery by the insured against the company has usually been limited
to the value of his share.44 Inference of agency or trust has not been drawn merely
from the fact that the insurance was placed upon the property at its full value."
Even where other cotenants were infants closely related to the insured, the insured
tenant in common has been limited in his recovery.4 Consistently with this view,
the insured tenant in common has been held to have no duty, arising merely out
of the cotenancy relationship, to share insurance proceeds with the other cotenants
"'Leyden v. Lawrence, 78 N. J. Eq. 453, 79 At. 615 (1g1), same case 79 N. J. Eq. 113, 81 Atl.
See Richards, supra note 5, at 79; Harvey, supra note
6, at 52.
"0Farmers' Union Mut. P. Ass'n v. San Luis State Bank, 86 Colo. 293, 281 Pac. 366 (1929). CI.
Columbian Insurance Company v. Lawrence, 2 Pet. 25, 46 (U. S. 1829) (vendee of realty in possession
under a contract subject to an unfulfilled condition).
' In Perkins v. Century Ins. Co., 303 Mich. 679, 7 N. W. ad io6 (1942), the insured owner of the
equity of redemption was held to be entitled to more than nominal recovery against the company
although the loss occurred on the last day of the existence of her right to redeem.
" The authorities have not been careful to distinguish between joint tenancy and tenancy in common
in connection with this subject.
" Porobenski v. American Alliance Ins. Co. of New York, 317 Pa. 410, 176 At. 205 (1935) (tenants
by the entirety). The 1943 New York standard fire policy omits this clause.
" Knight v. Eureka Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 26 Ohio St. 664, 2o Am. Rep. 778 (1875); Summer v.
Stark County Patrons' Mut. Ins. Co., 63 Ohio App. 369, 26 N. E. 2d 1021 (1940). But wee National
Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 231 Ala. 640, x66 So. 24 (1936) (insurer knew the facts and collected
full premium).
"'InBurrows v. Faf'mers' Alliance Ins. Co., xIxKan. 358, 207 Pac. 431 (1922) on rehearing, insured
was not permitted recovery beyond the amount of his own loss although insurer's agent knew of the
limitation on insured's interest at the time of application. Plaintiff was denied recovery on behalf of
the other co-owners because of a deficiency in his pleading. But see National Union Fire Ins. Co. v.
Morgan, 231 Ala. 64o, 166 So. 24 (1936), permitting full recovery where the insurer knew of the limitation on the insured's interest and with that knowledge issued a policy as for an absolute title
and
received full premiums.
121 (1911), affirmed 85 Ad. 1134 (N. J. 1912).

I American Ins. Co. v. Porter, 25 Ala. App. 250, 144 So. 129 (1932).
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whether or not the proceeds represent substantially the full value of the res.47
As might be expected, a tenant in common who did not insure the property has no
cause of action against the policyholder's company.4 8
Greater difficulty is presented by the measurement of a joint tenant's recovery
where he has insured for his own sole benefit. Since a joint tenant owns the whole
estate for some purposes in the law, the courts might on that ground conceivably
refuse to limit his recovery to the value of a fractional share of the estate. On the
other hand, without the limitation the danger is present of separate recoveries by
several joint tenants upon different policies in a sum total exceeding the amount
of the loss. A similar situation, resulting in recoveries probably totaling in excess
of the amount of the loss, was involved in a recent case in the Texas Court of Civil
Appeals, although there the interest of the insured was more nearly that of a partner
than joint tenant.49 The opinion seems to rest chiefly upon the presence of a valued
policy statute and upon the insurer's knowledge of the existence and amount of the
other insurance on the premises. No case has been found actually passing upon the
measure of recovery against the insurer by a joint tenant, as distinguished from a
tenant in common. There has been some dictum indicating that the insured's recovery would be limited. 0 The rights of other joint tenants to share in proceeds
recovered by an insured joint tenant are governed by the same considerations that
apply in the case of tenants in common. 5' It has been said that "whether the other
joint owner has an interest in law or equity in the insurance money so collected may
properly turn on the equities of the particular case."' 2
V
Life tenants, lessees for years, and tenants with various insecure tenures such as
estates at will or at sufferance or by the curtesy initiate, have made much trouble
7

Collette v. Long, 179 Miss. 650, 176 So. 528 (1937); Annely v. De Saussure, 26 S. C. 497, 2 S. .

.490 3(1887).

" Continental Ins. Co. v. Maxwell, 9 Kan. App. 268, 6o Pac. 539 (1900). Even where the insured

intended to act as agent for the co-owner as undisclosed principal, the co-owner was denied the right
to sue in Ritson v. Atlas Assurance Co., 272 Mass. 73, 17r N. . 448 (1930). But see Howard Ins. Co.
v. Chase, 5 Wall. 509 (U. S. r867). The named insured in the Ritson case was said to be entitled to
recover up to the value of his own interest, but no statement was made of what that would be. As to
whether breach of condition by one tenant in common bars recovery by innocent co-tenants, see Note, r48
A. L. R. 487 (i944).

" American Cent. Ins. Co. v. Harrison, 205 S. W. 2d 417 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947). The Court of
Civil Appeals permitted full recovery by a co-tenant in London Assur. Corporation v. Belcher, 5 S. W. 2d
844 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928), where the insurer knew that insured was only a part owner at the time
of issuing the policy. In that case also, excess recovery by two co-owners was the result.
" Miles v. Miles, 21I Ala. 26, 29, 99 So. 187, 190 (1924).
81 Miles v. Miles, 211 Ala. 26, 99 So. 187 (1924) (denying recovery by husband against wife who
had maintained insurance on joint property). See 5 APPLEMAN, op. ct. srupra
note 6, §3361; 46 C. J. S.
§1141 (1946).
82 Miles v. Miles, supra note 51, at 29, 99 So. at 190.
In a jurisdiction enforcing oral partitions
among joint or common owners, it seems that in any case where such a partition has set off the subject
of the insurance entirely to one co-tenant, such co-tenant should be entitled to full recovery for the loss
within the policy limit, he being deemed in equity the sole owner of the land. See 2 WARREN F.WALm,
ComI.ENTARES ON mE LAW OF RAVL PROPERTY 80 (3d ed. -1947).
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for the courts in this field, and the cases involving such persons show less uniformity
in their results than those so far discussed. In fact, the strict theory of indemnity
has been openly disregarded in some of the opinions in these cases."3
There ought to be little question that such a tenant who actually intends and
purports to insure only his own interest in the property should recover only the
value of that interest, which should be measured by the difference between the reasonable rental value and the rental cost to the insured for the probable remainder of the
term, to be computed from material evidence, including life tables if necessary. 4
Such a result does not conflict with the rule that ordinarily the insured is not entitled to loss of use or rents under a fire policy; computation of the total prospective
reasonable rental is merely a reasonable mode under the circumstances of determining
the "intrinsic value" of the life estate. It must be said, however, that there are some
cases which, while distinguishable, support the conclusion that the life tenant purporting to cover only his own interest may yet recover for the full loss to the entire res
within the policy limit. 5 This view can be traced back at least as far as Fran(lin
Ins. Company v. Drake.8 There the insured, whose wife owned a two-fifths undivided equitable interest in certain houses, "effected an insurance of his two-fifths in
said houses." The insured's own interest in the premises was only a right to their
use and enjoyment or their rents during the joint lives of himself and his wife, and
a prospective statutory tenancy by the curtesy after the death of the wife. The couft,
finding that the husband intended to insure the full two-fifths interest in the houses,
permitted recovery of the full value of the two-fifths interest within the limit of the
policy. There was no intimation that the husband might have acted as agent for his
wife in insuring the property. Instead the court used the following broad language
to justify full recovery."
If the assured had an insurable interest at the time of the insurance and also at the time
of loss, he has a right to recover the whole amount of damage to the property, not exceeding the sum insured, without regard to the value of the assured's interest in the
property.

The court cited mortgage cases, which support no such broad proposition, and the
hypothetical case of a lessee for years whose lease is about to expire but who
is said to be none the less entitled to recover the full value of the property destroyed
within the policy limit. The modern cases are divided on the latter proposition
with probably some preponderance of authority against it.5 8 It seems that the
5

Western Assur. Co. v. Stoddard, 88 Ala. 6o6, 7 So. 379 (1889); Merrctt v. Farmers' Insurance Co.,
42 Iowa xi (1875); The Franklin Marine and Fire Ins. Co. v. J. G. Drake, 41 Ky. (2 B. Mon.) 47
(184). Cf. Harnett and Thornton, stupra note 6, at 1176.
5'Getchell v. Mercantile & Mfrs. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 109 Me. 274, 83 Ad. 8ox (i912); Note, 42
L. R. A. (N. s.) 135 (1913). But see Harnett and Thornton, supra note 6, at 1176.
"See Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Bolling, 176 Va. 182, io S. E. 2d 518 (1940).
545 Ky. (2 B. Mon.) 47 (1-841).
7
I at 50.
ld.
58
Hale v. Simmons, 2oo Ark. 556, L39 S. W. 2d 696 (1940); Harrington v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 179
Minn. 5,10, 229 N. W. 792 (1930). See also Citizens' Fire Ins. Co. v. Lockridge, 132 Ky. 1, 5, rx6

SoE Lim
u TED-INTEMIT PROBLEMS

425

Kentucky court would have been on safer ground to find a fiduciary relation between
the insured and his wife and sustain recovery on that basis rather than completely
disregard the principle of indemnity. However, the decision has had a pervasive
influence in subsequent cases where the rights of life tenants and lessees have been
concerned. 9
Where a life tenant has insured the property up to its full value with the manifest
intent of benefiting the remainderman or reversioner as well as himself, there has
been little difficulty in sustaining full recovery." In that event the insured holds the
proceeds in trust for the remainderman to the extent that they exceed the value of
his own interest.8 '
The cases in which the life tenant has insured up to full value for his own sole
benefit are divided as to the measure of recovery against the company. Here,
generally speaking, the courts have not been attracted by any theory of agency or
trust. 2 An old Illinois case permitted the life tenant full recovery in this situation,
63
relying upon the supposed principle announced in the Drake case, and in 1875 the
Supreme Court of Iowa took the ground that a smaller sum would not compensate
the insured life tenant for the loss sustained." This latter argument is said to be
5
Actuespecially forceful where the insured occupied the premises as a homestead.
ally it proceeds from the premise that the insurer has agreed to indemnify the
insured for all loss he sustains as a result of the insured event. Such is not the
contract in most of these cases. Reasoning which allows full recovery to the life
tenant merely because of loss of use and occupancy cannot be reconciled with reasoning which denies recovery for use and occupancy by an owner under an ordinary fire
policy. 6
Opposed to the Illinois and Iowa decisions referred to are two cases applying the
strict principle of indemnity and limiting the life tenant's recovery to the estimated
61
value of his interest. In Beekman v. Fulton & M. Counties F. M. Fire Ins. Ass'n,
a life tenant, fully insuring the premises solely for his own benefit, was limited in
recovery to the value of his right of use for life, to be determined upon evidence of
the locality and surroundings. The Appellate Division seemed to approve the
S. W. 303, 304 (1909). Contra: Mississippi Fire Ins. Co. v. Planters' Bank, 138 Miss. 275, 103 So. 84
(1925) (under valued policy statute); Mancini v. Yorkshire Ins. Co., Ltd., of York, England, 54 R. I.
79, 17o At.

82 (1934).

See PATTERSON, Op. cit. supra note 3, at 280.

" See Merrett v. Farmers' Insurance Co., 42 Iowa 11 (3875).
°Convis v. Citizens' Mut. F. Ins. Co., 127 Mich. 616, 86 N. NV. 994 (i9oi); Trade Ins. Company
v. Barraeliff, 45 N. I. L. 543 (3883). For the problems involved where a testator insured the property,
sec Note, 21 COL. L. REv. 491 (921).

1

o' Convis v. Citizens' Mut. F. Ins. Co., supra note 6o; Note, 126 A. L. R. 336, 349 (1940).
0 See In re Gorman's Estate, 32X Pa. 292, 184 Ad. 86 (3936).
' Andes Ins. Co. v. Fish, 71 IIl. 62o, 625 (1874).
04 Merrett v. Farmers' Insurance Co., 42 Iowa as (1875).
" McClain, supra note 6, at 518, quoting from the opinion of Bowen, L. J., in Castellain v. Preston,
Q. B. D. 380, 400 (1883), where support may be found for almost any position in the law of fire

insurance.
o Cf. Harnett and Thornton, supra note 6, 3376, n. 85.
0166 App. Div. 72, 73 N. Y. Supp. 33o (3d Dep't 19o1).
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use of mortality tables for measuring the life of the plaintiff, but rejected the company's contention that the value of the annual use of the house to the insured should
be computed automatically at five per centum of the cash value of the house in accordance with the New York rule for computing the present value of life estates.
In the Beekman case, the company seems not to have been aware of the limitation
on the insured's interest at the time the policy was issued.
The following year, the Massachusetts high court, hewing to the line of strict indemnity, held that a tenant by the curtesy initiate who purported to insure fully his
wife's property for his own benefit must be limited in recovery to the value of his
inchoate right at the time of the loss. 8 In the court's view, longevity was to be
determined primarily by life tables, but actual probabilities might be shown by
testimony. The court remarked upon the difficulty of assessing damages in such a
case.
These cases arise out of a situation that seems to be rather common, in which a
man thoughtlessly insures his wife's property in his own name. Considering the
large number of property insurance transactions and the fact that they are seldom
entered into with advice of counsel, the frequency of the error is not surprising.
In some cases the agent of the company is aware of the true state of the title; in
others, not. If the company refuses to pay the loss, the insured upon suit is confronted with the defenses of misrepresentation or non-disclosure and want of insurable interest. If the company knew the state of the title when it issued the policy,
or if the insured made no actual misstatement about it, the policyholder usually
succeeds in overcoming the first defense with the weapon of estoppel. But in jurisdictions which give the husband no possessory rights in his wife's land the defense
of insurable interest has often barred recovery ° We are thus considering here the
fate of that remnant of insureds who have surmounted those absolute defenses, and
the question is whether their recovery should be limited by strict application of the
doctrine of indemnity and the doctrine that insurance is a personal contract.
One basic argument for the doctrine of indemnity in fire insurance, that the incentive to incendiarism should be reduced as much as possible, lacks force when it
is sought to be applied in this particular type of case. Normally, the marital relationship is close enough and the practical interests of both spouses are so nearly identical
that there is no more incentive for the husband to burn his wife's property than there
is for her to burn her own, especially where the insured res is a building which both
spouses are occupying as a homestead. Perhaps somewhat more forceful in this
situation is the argument that the insurer should have the privilege of passing upon
the character of those for whose losses it may become liable. Still, the purpose of
the privilege is to enable the company to reject undesired moral risks, and the actual
difference in quantum of moral risk assumed by insuring the non-owning, rather than
"'Doyle v. American Fire Ins. Co., 181 Mass. 139, 63 N. E. 394 (19o2).

" Bassett v. Farmers' and Merchants' Ins. Co., 85 Neb. 85,
362 (1930).

122

N. W. 703 (r9o9); Note, 68 A. L. R.
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the owning, spouse is normally very slight. Normally also, insurance by the nonowning spouse is not taken out with any intent to make a wagering contract. If it
appears that the owning spouse has not insured the res, that fact is a circumstance
tending to show that the policy taken out by the other spouse was not actually a
wager.
For these reasons the courts have not been too sympathetic with efforts by some
insurers to limit recovery in these cases when there has been no intentional deception,
wagering, or other misbehavior on the part of the insured or his spouse, and where
the company has collected premiums at the full rate.7 The difficulty has been in
finding a sound legal basis for permitting full recovery. A number of techniques
have been employed. Some courts have implied an agency in the husband to insure
on behalf of his wife.71 This device saves the indemnity principle but runs afoul
of the personal-contract doctrine, which bars recovery by an undisclosed principal
on a contract of insurance made by his agent.72 - A number of courts, following the
dictum of the Drake case, supra,and a pronouncement in Corpus Juris,7" have taken
the position in these and other cases that if the insured had an insurable interest at
the time of the loss, he is entitled to recover the full amount of the loss within the
policy limit, regardless of the extent of his particular interest.74 As a general principle, this proposition seems manifestly unsound,75 but it has proved useful in the
type of case under discussion.
Reformation does not seem to be helpful. There is clearly no basis for reformation if the company was unaware of the true state of the title at the time of issuing
the policy.70 Even if the company knew the facts at the time of issuing the policy
it will still be impossible in most cases to find a promise by the company to insure
the true owner, without which there is no proper basis for reformation.77
Some courts, especially in the South, have adopted the view that where the company knew of the limited nature of the insured's interest at the time of issuing the
policy, and with such knowledge issued the insurance as upon an absolute title and
thereafter collected premiums in the same amount as would be due for insurance of
the entire ownership of the property, the insured should be compensated as if he held
the fee title.78 This rule, which has been applied in other types of limited-interest
"0See Bassett v. Farmers' and Merchants' Ins. Co., supra note 69, at 88, 122 N. W. at 704.
' Trade Ins. Co. v. Barradiff, 45 N. J. L. 543 (1883). The court stressed the fact that the policy
showed a design to cover the entire ownership, from which it followed that the property insured was
not necessarily the interest of the policyholder alone. The court treated the wife as a disclosed principal
of the policyholder and said that the measure of recovery would be the damages accruing to whatever
interests are covered by the policy so far as the insured represents those interests.
"' Ritson v. Atlas Assur. Co., 272 Mass. 73, 171 N. E. 448 (1930).
7326 C. J. §459 (1921).
"Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Harris, 50 Ga. App. 75, 177 S. E. 65 (1934); Kludt v. German
Mut. 5Fire Ins. Co., 152 Wis. 637, 14o N. NV. 321 (1913).
See Harrington v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 79 Minn. 50, 229 N. W. 792 (1930).
"oSee By-Fi Building and Loan Ass'n v. New York Casualty Co., l16 N. J. Eq. 265, 173 Ad. go
0I934).
" See Salomon v. North British and Mercantile Ins. Co., 215 N. Y. 214, IO9 N. E. 121 (1915).
"8Western Assurance Co. v. Stoddard, 88 Ala. 6o6, 7 So. 379 (1889).
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cases, seems to be thought of as resting upon the basis of estoppel,8 0 although frequently no reason other than precedent is given in support of it. This doctrine is
broad enough in scope to accommodate the husband-wife cases where the insurer
knows the state of the title at the time of issuing the policy. Perhaps, where the insurer did not know the true condition of the title it ought to be permitted to limit the
insured's recovery, if any, to the value of his own interest even in cases where a man
innocently insures his wife's property. But a rule of estoppel which prevents the company from limiting recovery where it has accepted premiums with knowledge of all
the facts and where there is no fraud or wagering on the part of the insured, seems to
effect substantial justice without violation of desirable principles. Actually, despite
the differences in the stated grounds for the decisions, the results of the husbandwife cases are consistent with this idea. This approach seems more desirable than
a modification of the doctrine of indemnity along the lines suggested by McClain."'
The question of the rights of life tenant and remainderman or reversioner inter se
has been exhaustively analyzed and will not be examined here. 2 In the majority of
jurisdictions the courts have refused to draw an analogy with the land contract cases
and, in the absence of circumstances raising the inference of an agency or trust, have
permitted the life tenant to retain the proceeds of the insurance.8 3 A minority of
jurisdictions have found a fiduciary obligation on the part of the life tenant in this
situation to hold the proceeds of the insurance for the benefit of the remainderman., 4
The majority rule creates no difficulty under the doctrine of indemnity since these
cases do not involve the question of measuring the life tenant's recovery against the
insurer. The courts have not been under the same pressure that they have in the
79

land contract cases to prevent enrichment of the insured as a result of the loss; the
life tenant, unlike the vendor, bears part of the risk of loss, while the remainderman,
unlike the vendee, has not typically parted with value for the property which has
been destroyed or damaged. Consequently, the difference in results in the two
classes of cases is understandable quite apart from the effects of equitable conversion.
"'National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 231 Ala. 640, 166 So. 24 (936) (tenancy in common);
Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Harris, 5o Ga. App. 75, 177 S. E. 65 (1934) (lease); Simmons v. Home
Ins. CO., 235 Ill. App. 344 (1925) (lease); London Assur. Corporation v. Belcher, 5 S. W. ad 844 (Tex.
Civ. App. x928) (tenancy in common).
" Western Assur. Co. v. Stoddard, 88 Ala. 6o6, 613, 7 So. 379, 380 (1889). Opinions in thcse
cases frequently cite decisions stating that recovery by one having an insurable interest should be permitted up to the value of the property regardless of the limitation on the insured's interest. See note 74
suipra.

1. McClain, supra note 6, at 523: "The rule of indemnity . . . has therefore, it seems, become a rule
also for determining the amount of loss to be paid, with the limitation, hovever, that where the interest of
insured is indeterminate, he shall not be denied full indemnity against possible damage from the loss."
Cf. Harnett and Thornton, supra note 6, at 1176, and Bonbright and Katz, supra note 4, at 863-867.
t
See GOBLE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 673.
" See Note, 126 A. L. R. 336 (940).
"See Note, 68 A. L. R. 347 (930).
" Crisp County Lumber Co. v. Bridges, 187 Ga. 484, 200 S. E. 777 (1939). See Note, 126 A. L. II.
336, 351 (1940).
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Where a lessee for years has purported fully to insure the leased property, the
authorities are in conflict as to his right to recover the insurance in full where, under
the terms of the lease, title to the property will vest in the lessor at the end of the
term.'
The lessee for years has a clear insurable interest,"8 but the considerations
which have moved the courts sometimes to find an agency relationship in the hus-

band-wife cases discussed above have generally not been present here where the
parties are normally engaged in an arm's-length business transaction. Perhaps the
moral hazard in permitting full recovery to a business lessee who has insured the
premises up to their full value is greater here than in the case where a husband
has insured his wife's property. For whatever reason, the lessee for years is more

likely to be limited in recovery to an amount equal to the estimated value of his
interest than is the husband who has insured his wife's property which he occupies as
a homestead'
In the absence of circumstances raising the inference of agency or trust, the lessor
or lessee who is paid the proceeds of his own insurance holds them free of any claim

by the other party, even though his policy covered the value of the full undivided
ownership of the property88 This rule is followed more widely than is the analogous
majority rule in the case of life tenants and remaindermen s9
VII
With the assumptions set forth at the beginning of this paper in mind, the following conclusions may be drawn from the limited-interest cases:
(i) Arguments by analogy from limited-interest cases of one category to those
of another should be made with caution. The considerations underlying the rules
differ in the various categories.
(2) The facts of each case must be examined with unusual care lest unwarranted

generalizations be drawn. The language of the particular policy, some statutory provision, or some element of agency, trust, or estoppel frequently determines the result.
(3) In only a few cases has total recovery by all owners of limited interests in
excess of the amount of the loss been observed. So far the courts have not expressed
particular concern over the possibility of such excess recovery.
(4) As to the rights inter se of the limited-interest owners discussed in this

article, it may be concluded broadly that in the absence of any express or implied
agreement, trust, or agency, the insured holds the proceeds of the insurance free of
rights of the other owners, except that bailees under trust or commission policies,
"5 See note 58 supra.
R. VAMs.cE,

Sf WILIAM

HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 127 (ad

ed. 1930).

a Assuming that the husband recovers anything. See Harrington v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 179 Minn.
510, 229 N. W. 792 (1930); Harnett and Thornton, supra note 6, at 1177.
:8 Miller v. Gold Beach Packing Co., 13r Ore. 302, 282 Pac. 764 (1929).
9
, See Note, 66 A. L. R. 864 (1930).
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vendors of land, and, in a few states, life tenants, hold the proceeds of their insurance
for the benefit of their opposite parties so far as such proceeds exceed the value of
their own interest in the res.
(5) The strict indemnity principle is rather faithfully adhered to except in cases
where a husband fully insures his wife's property in his own name and the insurer
issues the policy and collects premiums at the full rate with knowledge of the
'condition of the title. In that case most courts permitting recovery at all permit it
in full, although the insured is often defeated by lack of insurable interest. Some
states permit any limited owner having an insurable interest to recover in full in the
absence of fraud where the insurer issued the policy with knowledge of the facts and
collected premiums at the full-ownership rate.
(6) The temptation is strong, in dealing with limited-interest problems, to apply
the technical rules of property in conjunction with the general principles of insurance
in a rather narrow, formal manner. It is to be hoped that the courts will continue
to .approach these problems with the- primary aim of achieving socially desirable
results.

